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Introduction
The total cost of innovation is considered one of the determinant factors for achieving sustainable economic growth. This explains the great concern 1 However, our knowledge of the factors that inuence innovation and its related activities is not as exhaustive as it could be. The process toward innovation is not as linear as it should be, as the dierent variables that are expected to determine and incentive innovation are so numerous that the problem of omitted variables is very likely to inuence the interpretation of empirical studies.
The factors inuencing innovation can be both of an internal or an external nature. The former can include features such as age, size, and being a member of a certain group; strategic features, such as the presence on foreign markets; nancial features as the solidity of a rm and its relationship to the banking system. Among the latter there can be the level of competitiveness of the market, its socio-economic structure and the nancial situation of a country.
The present study aims at contributing to analyse the determinants of innovation, with a special focus on rm risk. Theoretical literature on innovation does not oer unequivocal predictions about the eects of rm risk on innovation capability. One of the main reasons is the diculty of accurately dening the concept of risk. Risk and uncertainty are, in fact, typical features of all entrepreneurial activities; hence, various rm risk factors can have contrastive eects on the probability of innovation. For this reason, while analysing various sources of rm risk, we combine these factors in a single model allowing us to study the overall eect on rm innovation capability. The measure we employ is one-year default probability of a rm.
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This analysis is carried out by examining a wide sample of Italian manufacturing businesses. The empirical model employed aims at verifying the main innovation determinants, starting with the results obtained in the literature and subsequently inserting the rms' one-year probability of default in order to study the impact of risk on rm innovation capability.
The results show that rm risk reduces the tendency to innovate. Moreover, the size of a rm, its inclusion in a consortium, its export tendency and the level of diversication, are all relevant for determining its innovation capability.
1 See for example Cohen and Levin (1989) and Cohen (1995) . 2 Firm default probability allows us by integrating in a single model all the dierent factors of risk (such as cash ow volatility, technological risk, demand uncertainty etc.) to assess empirically the impact of risk on the innovation probability of a rm. 2 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a detailed review of the literature on the determinants of innovation. Section 3 is devoted to present the data set we use, explaining also our econometric strategy. In section 4 we show our main results and robustness checks. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Background literature
In the existing literature, the impact of rm risk on innovation capability has not been studied comprehensively. The available works analysed only the impact of single aspects of rm risk. After a presentation of these works, we consider other possible innovation determinants, which are empirically analysed in order to isolate the impact of risk.
Risk
The relation between riskiness of rm and innovation is related to the literature that study the best way to nance innovation. This strand of literature is very important, because a central problem in the managing of technology is the nancing of technological development and innovation. Schumpeter (1942) asserted that the innovation process is best nanced through internal nance (what he called monopolist prots). Furthermore, Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) found empirical evidence that good internal nancial conditions are likely to increase innovation. The reasons of the crucial role of internal nance in nancing innovating rms are to be found in the literature about information asymmetries.
Some studies show that the riskiness of rm aects the amount of investments, especially the investments meant for innovation. These results are true in particular for the rm's cash ows volatility.
3 In fact, a higher cash ow volatility implies that a rm is more likely to have periods of internal cash ow shortfalls. The analysis of Minton and Schrand (1999) indicates that rms do not simply react to shortfalls by changing the timing of discretionary investment to match cash ow realizations. Rather, rms forgo investment. Furthermore, empirical studies show greater volatility of cash ows is positively linked with a higher cost of access to external nance. Finally, dierent authors (Gibbins et al., 1990 ; Chaney and Lewis 1995, and Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995) have insisted on the adverse reputation eects of high earnings volatility for rms and their managers.
However, the chief way in which rm risk aects innovation capability is that of the access to external capital. As a matter of fact, not all rms are able to nance their innovation projects by drawing on internal cash ows. Hall (2002) demonstrated that small businesses and start-ups presented major problems when it came to investing in new technologies. In these cases, the companies were forced to deal with asymmetric information problems, typical of the relationship between businesses and the nancial sector, which increased in the case of funding for innovative projects. Indeed, banks are unable to fully distinguish between their customers, since they do not have the necessary information to evaluate either the quality of the project or the risk of opportunistic behaviour by the counterparties (Rajan e Zingales, 2001 ). In a similar context it is probable that the bank is wary of the default probability of the rm it is dealing with. Thus, we can predict that the companies with higher default probability are less likely to carry out innovative projects.
2.2
The main determinant of Innovation
The literature on innovation built a theory focusing on several possible determinants of innovation, whose role is often not unanimously accepted. In particular, the factors inuencing innovation activities can be divided in internal and external.
As for internal factors, size is one of the possible determinants of innovation which is not unanimously accepted. Schumpeter (1912) argued that small rms were the best at innovating. With a decided turn with respect to his previous views, Schumpeter (1942) argued that monopoly could be a spur to research and development. According to Scherer (1992) , even though there is evidence that small rms are rich in innovating ideas, generally the ux of innovation comes from large, well established enterprisers, operating in open markets, where the possibility of innovation itself stimulates the overall innovation. In general, most theorists argue that size is a relevant factor in innovation for several reasons: i) research and development (R&D) projects typically involve large xed costs (such as investments in human capital) which can be covered only if sales are suciently large; ii) R&D features in-volve economies of scale and scope in the production of innovations; iii) large and diversied rms can absorb better the losses determined by economically unprotable projects; iv) large rms can undertake many projects at any one time and hence reduce the risks of R&D.
Furthermore, some empirical works show evidence of a threshold eect of rm size on R&D activity (Greer and Rhoades, 1976; Shrieves, 1978) . On the other hand, there are both theoretical and empirical studies that argue the opposite thesis: Audretsch (1987, 1990) show how in smaller rms (less than 100 employees) innovation per worker is higher than in larger rms; Pavitt et al. (1987) found that innovation is more likely to come from large rms and small rms than from medium-sized and very small rms.
Another factor to study is the eciency of the rm. Higher eciency implies a higher return both for a mature and a new technology. This means that the entrepreneur can pledge more expected returns given innovation.
However, if the new technology is exposed to the bank's hold-up, a higher asset value will increase the outside option of the bank in a renegotiation of the initial contract, exacerbating the bank's rent extraction (Rajan, 1992) .
Hence, higher eciency does not necessarily render innovation more appealing.
About the impact of the bank's hold-up on innovation, Minetti (2004) shows that in an economy with limited contract enforceability, informednance can inhibit technological progress to slow down the depreciation of its information on mature technologies.
A measure of size considered among the determinants of innovation is the number of countries in which the rm operates. Petersen and Rajan (1997) found that geographic expansion preceded increased spending in R&D, while an high level of R&D spending did not precede expansion. The increase in international competition that rms face, could be an incentive to innovate.
Let us turn now to consider the external factors aecting a rm's ability to innovate. The rst one is the socio-economic structure of the country in which the rm operates. Socio-economic structure is generally considered an important source of incentives for innovation and rm development. An important question about local conditions is: does local nancial development impact on innovations? Does nancial integration provide means to outdo possible local nancial backwardness? Quite obviously, both theory and evidence show that agents established in regions characterised by well developed nancial systems have more and better possibilities to get external nance.
Furthermore Guiso et al. (2004) have demonstrated that even if the nancial market is integrated, the role of local dierences remains important. The effects of these evidences are more important as the size of the rm decreases:
small rms have really little chances to obtain nance from far located nancial institutions. Both Berger et al. (2001) and Petersen and Rajan (2002) found that small rms are less likely to borrow from distant banks, which makes them more dependent on the level of local nancial development.
A crucial topic in theoretical literature on innovation, such as Aghion and Howitt (1998), relates to the probability that the rm faces an innovation opportunity, as induced by factors outside the rm's control. The main example are knowledge spillovers among rms in the same industry or among rms that belong to a group or consortium.
Finally, it is important to underline the role of market structure. The literature on endogenous growth theory conrms the results in Schumpeter (1942) . For example, Aghion and Howitt (1998) showed how in a market characterised by increased competition, incentives to research by rms are reduced. Murro (2007) showed how, in a more competitive market, the effectiveness of a public policy designed to encourage innovation is reduced by means of a direct commitment in the eld of basic research.
2.3
Product innovation and process innovation 
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The contrasting results between product innovation and process innovation show the dierent natures of the two innovation types. Cohen and Klepper (1996) modelled the dierences between the two types of innovation, underlining the dierent incentives that spurred companies to embark on product or process innovation. Process innovation reduced production costs, whereas product innovation increased the price that consumers were willing to pay. Accordingly, dierent factors can have dierent eects on the two innovation types. Dierent incentives also play a role in the way these activities are funded. It is this dierence which is most interesting in our context. Cohen and Klepper (1996) showed that rms tended to nance process innovation, rather than product innovation, by means of internal cash ow. This result is conrmed by Herrera and Minetti (2007) , who show that the positive impact of the length of the relationship between bank and rm is somewhat stronger for product than for process innovations. They propose two explanations for this result. The rst relates to the fact that product innovations can be more resource-demanding than process innovations because they require larger purchases of new equipment. The second relates to the role of secrecy, which is thought to be more important for process than for product innovations.
Dierent ways of funding lead to a dierent impact of risk on innovation.
If external nancing is considered the main channel through which rm risk aects innovation capability, then the type of innovation which requires less external nancing will be less susceptible to risk.
3 Empirical methodology and data
3.1
The empirical model
The aim of this paper is to investigate if the probability of default of the rm inuences rms to undertake and realize innovative projects. To do this we model the innovation choice of the rm. Denote by y * 1 the pledgeable expected return of the new technology net of the bank's opportunity cost of funds.
5 See also Romer (1990) , Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Grith et al. (2004) .
Denote by y * 2 the return that the entrepreneur expects to appropriate from the new technology net of the expected return from the mature technology.
The above analysis implies that the rm innovates if y * i = min(y * 1 , y * 2 ) > 0.
Thus, the rm's decision to innovate can be modeled as:
with i = 1, .., n and where y i is a measure of the innovation choice, a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the rm innovates and zero otherwise, x i is a measure of the probability of default, z 1 denotes a matrix of controls, and u i1 is the residual (u 
Generally, a 1 could be interpreted as the response of the rm's innovation choice to x i . However, there are a potential problem with this interpretation. The determination of x i can be endogenous to the innovation choice y i . In fact, as some straightforward theoretical contribution on nancial imperfections and credit rationing stressed 6 , investments in R&D and, in general, in innovative projects are characterised by a considerable high degree of uncertainty. In fact, the conspicuous amount of investments required to sustain innovative projects, the high mortality rate of those projects and the time to market are factors that increase the level of the rm's risk. Furthermore, the high level of idiosyncrasies connected to innovative projects worsens the asymmetric information issues between rms and credit institutions, thus fuelling credit rationing phenomena.
We correct these problems using a two-stage estimation approach. We dene z i2 as a matrix of instrumental variables that are correlated with the riskiness of the rm, but aect the innovation decision only through the eects on the probability of default. The eect of these instruments on x i is captured by d 22 in the``riskiness equation'':
where z i1 refers to the control variables in (2), z i2 is the matrix of instruments, and u i2 is the residual (u i2 ∼ N (0, σ 2 )). We estimate the model 6 See among others: Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) found a strong relationship between R&D investments and cash ows; Guiso (1998) demonstrated a link between high tech rms and credit rationing; Savignac (2006) investigated the impact of nancial constraints on innovation. (1)(3) using two methods: two-stage least squares (2SLS) and two-stage conditional maximum likelihood (2SCML). The 2SLS estimation amounts to assuming that the probability of innovation is linear in the parameters a 1 and d. Although this linear probability model usually works well for values of the explanatory variables that are close to the sample average, it suers from two limitations. First, for certain combinations of the explanatory variables, the predicted probabilities can be greater than one or less than zero.
Second, the partial eect of any explanatory variable, expressed in levels, is restricted to be constant. To overcome these limitations, we also estimate the model (1)(3) using the 2SCML technique. We show also the results of model (1)- (2), estimated with the maximum likelihood probit model. This survey aimed at providing the strategic information to the banking group, while striving to propose the policies for the promotion of rm competitiveness. Over the years, this survey has proved a fertile eld for research: for example, Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso (2000) used it to analyse the types of indebtedness of Italian companies, and Herrera and Minetti (2007) studied the impact of relationship lending on rm innovation capability.
In our analysis, we used the dataset in several dierent ways. First, considering partial temporal coincidence between the survey data and the data on the default probability of the rms, we took into account only the 4289 rms from the most recent survey (2001) (2002) (2003) . Next, a dierent risk variable, one deriving from the balance sheet data, was used in order to test the robustness of the results. This enabled us to use the observations of each survey. In this case, there were 13466 observations. The rms present in more than one survey were repeated. In those cases where the annual variables of a rm, such as balance sheet entries and the number of employees, were available, we took into account the mean of the period under consideration.
Finally, in order to study the variability among rms, a data panel study was carried out, taking into account only the 644 rms present in all the three surveys. See Table 1 for the denitions of the variables.
In Table 2 we reported summary statistics for each survey. Geographic distribution of the rms revealed a clear preponderance of rms from Northern Italy (more than 65% of the total), while other rms were based equally in the Centre and South (with a slight majority in the Centre). The distribution among sectors, dened according to Pavitt's taxonomy, showed the preponderance in all the surveys of businesses pertaining to traditional manufacturing sectors, amounting to almost a half of the sample (this percentage was lower only in the 1995-1997 span, amounting to 42%). The portion of high technology rms was very low, failing to exceed 5% of the sample. The average dimension of the rms, measured according to the number of the employees, was small to medium. A comparison among the dierent surveys showed that the medium size of the businesses varied considerably: in the rst survey under consideration, the average number of the employees equalled 114; in the second survey it decreased to 86; in the third it equalled 138 employees. Another signicant variable was that of the rms' net sales, which decreased from 515,000 euro in the rst survey to 379,000 euro in the most recent one. More stable was the average rm age, slightly exceeding 20 years (23 years for the two earlier surveys, 28 for the most recent one). Table 2 , the percentage of the innovative rms varied signicantly in the three surveys. Indeed, in the rst survey 75% of the rms had made some type of innovation; in the second survey this percentage decreased to 53%, whereas in the third survey it grew to 62%. The distribution according to the innovation type varied as well. In the rst survey, 68% of the rms made process innovations while 31% of the rms carried out product innovations. In the span covered by the second survey, however, the percentages of the two types of innovation were almost equal: 26% of the rms carried out product innovations, while 27% made process innovations. In the last survey, the rms carrying out product innovations were by far more numerous (42%, while only 20% carried out process innovations). Table 3 In assessing rm risk we used as a variable the probability of default of the rm. This choice was determined by the fact that the probability of default represents a good synthesis of various factors that make a company risky. Apart from decisively inuencing the decisions of the rm's sponsors, this information is also the most easily available one. Two methodologies were used in order to evaluate the default probability of a rm. The rst one is Moody's KMV RiskCalc Italy model, which calculates the probability of a rm not being able to repay its nancial debt in the following year. This model employs following nancial variables: protability, nancial leverage, debt coverage, liquidity, activity, size (see Table 4 for a detailed description).
Unfortunately, the dataset available in this model only partially coincided with the one we used. As a matter of fact, Moody's started the evaluations of Italian companies only in 2002; this is why in using this variable, we only took into account the most recent survey at our disposal. Among the robustness checks of the results, we used another measure for evaluating rm risk: the Z-score. This formula, rst proposed by Altman (1968) , measures a rm's nancial solidity correlated to the two-year default probability. As control variables, we used the ones generally considered to determine innovation. The analysis of paragraph 2.2 suggests that innovation is a function of some variables typical of the rm, and of the variables characteristic of the market in which it operates. Among the features of a rm, one of the main factors to be taken into consideration is its size. We used the logarithm of the number of employees as a proxy for size. Same results would be obtained if the logarithm of the rm's net assets were used as a size variable.
Another factor bearing on the decision to innovate is a company's intrinsic eciency. Following Herrera and Minetti (2007), we examined this factor in two ways. The rst is the analysis of the workforce composition. We inserted two variables indicating the percentage of the employees with a secondary school diploma and the percentage of those with a university degree.
Furthermore, we inserted a dummy variable that took the value of 1 where 7 The Z-score formula for non-listed companies is as follows: Zscore = 0.717T 1 + 0.847T 2 + 3.107T 3 + 0.42T 4 + 0.988T 5 , con T 1 = (Current AssetsCurrent Liabilities) / Total Assets; T 2 = Retained Earnings / Total Assets; T 3 = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes / Total Assets; T 4 = Book Value of Equity / Total Liabilities; T 5 = Sales / Total Assets. The Z-score can be seen as a measure of nancial soundness of the rm which is correlated to the probability of default in the two following years. The higher its value, the smaller the probability of default. the rm in question had ISO9000 certicate attesting the production process eciency and the product quality. Two remaining characteristics taken into account were age (its logarithm) and the quota of the majority shareholder.
In order to examine the possibility of knowledge spillovers, we inserted a dummy taking the value of 1 where the rm was part a consortium. As the variable determining the rm's international presence, we used the answer to the question whether the rm had exported its products in the last year considered in the survey. Moreover, in order to assess the competitiveness of the market in which the rm in question operated, we inserted the dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the rm faced international competition.
Another relevant factor taken into account was the level of the rm's diversication. A more diversied rm has more opportunities to exploit scope economies deriving from innovation. Plausibly, the higher the number of industries in which the rm is active, the more diversied is the rm. In order to examine this factor we code dummy variables for whether the rm is classied in a three-, four-, or ve-digit ATECO sector (as in Herrera and In order to solve the problem of endogeneity between the choice to inno-vate and rm risk, we used a two-stage approach. As instrumental variable of rm risk we used the percentage variation in workforce. This variable specic to all rms is a good risk proxy, since a rm will probably decide to adapt its workforce to the future outlook, despite the inexibility of the Italian labour market. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that workforce variation inuences a rm's decision to innovate. 8 
Results
The results of the evaluation of innovation determinants are presented in Table 5 . They show that rm risk signicantly reduces the likelihood of innovation by the rm. Due to the endogeneity of default probability, we also estimated the model using 2SLS (two-stage least squares) and 2SCML
(two-stage conditional maximum likelihood) methods. Table 6 shows the results of the rst stage of 2SLS. The Durbin test enabled us to exclude the null hypothesis of exogeneity of variables.
Analysing the impact of the instrument on risk, it was be observed that the percentage variation in workforce was negative. Predictably, the less risky rms were those that could allow themselves an increase in workforce.
Commenting on the eects of the remaining variables, it can be observed that size, age and eciency (assessed on the basis of ISO9000 certicate) had a negative eect on rm risk, whereas a larger quota by the majority shareholder, geographic position and the inclusion in a high tech sector increased rm risk. Table 7 shows the estimates of both instrumented models. We will comment on the results of 2SCML model, since the 2SLS estimates are qualitatively analogous. These models conrmed the signicance of risk in explaining the rm's choice to innovate. The marginal eect of instrumented estimation proved to be much higher than the basic Probit estimation.
When other innovation determinants were veried, the results conrmed the previously discussed theoretical predictions. The size of the business measured according to the number of people employed had a positive eect on the likelihood of innovation. The international presence had a role in driving innovation. In fact, the rms reporting they exported had a greater probability of innovation than those that did not export. As regards rm eciency, the workforce composition aected the probability of innovation, while having ISO9000 certicate did not prove statistically signicant. The percentage of the employees holding a university degree appeared quite relevant and had with the exception of risk the highest marginal eect among innovation determinants. Firm age aected innovation negatively.
Another aspect we veried is the eect of the possibility of knowledge spillovers among the same-sector businesses and the businesses in a consortium. The results conrmed the importance of spillovers in creating innovation opportunities. Indeed, the rms that were part of a consortium have a 0,08 higher probability of realizing innovation than the others. Moreover, an exam of Pavitt's sectors showed that belonging to a high technology or a highly specialized sector increases innovation probability. Among the factors external to the company, the regional development rate as the level of bank concentration proved to be signicant, whereas geographic location and the annual growth of the provincial added value were not statistically signicant.
To verify our hypothesis that external nancing is the main channel whereby rm risk aects innovation decisions, we carried out two tests. Primary we analysed the impact of risk on product and process innovation.
After to test for the need of external nance we split the sample in two groups: the rst one made up by the small rms (the rms that have a number of employes inferior to the median); the second group included the big rms.
We observed in section 2.3 that the literature considered the possibility that some factors aect dierently product innovation and process innovation. This is why we analysed the impact of risk on both types of innovation. Tables 8 and 9 show the results for product and process innovation respectively. 10 We relate the three methods of evaluation we used, since, especially with regards to process innovation, the hypothesis of the endogeneity of risk is to be excluded. The results of this evaluation showed a clear dierence between the two types of innovation. Whereas the results concerning product innovation were conrmed, albeit with a lower signicance level, process innovation appeared independent of rm risk. In fact, in no case did the one-year probability of default appear signicant, according to none of the three evaluation methods.
This result supported by the predictions in the theoretical literature, according to which product innovation is more dependant than process innovation on external nancing conrms the interpretation oered for the impact of risk on innovation probability. If external nancing is considered the main channel whereby rm risk aects innovation decisions, it is predictable that process innovation should be less dependant on risk.
As far as other innovation determinants are concerned, the results for each innovation type vary. With regards to product innovation, the results obtained were similar to those regarding innovation in general. The only differences were those determined by the membership in a consortium (which is not more signicant for this type of innovation) and by the level of diversication, which looses its signicance (except in the case of 4-digit ATECO level).
Some results related to process innovation diered from the estimates so far considered. In order to explain process innovation, both the ISO9000 certicate (which had positive value) and the presence of international competition were signicant. The latter decreased the probability of achieving process innovation. On the other hand, the workforce composition, regional nancial development, the level of diversication and the age of the rm were not signicant.
A further partial conrmation of our hypothesis was provided by the check carried out by dividing the sample in two groups according to the dimension of the rm. The results of this estimate, presented in Table 10 , show that for the big rms the marginal eect of RISK is not signicant (2SCML estimate).
We carried out a robustness check by using another variable evaluating 10 We used wider denitions of product innovation and process innovation: they refer both to product (process) innovation proper and to organizational and managerial innovation related to product (process) innovation. The results obtained if organizational and managerial innovation is excluded are qualitatively identical. rm risk. The variable in question is Z-score, which measures a rm's nancial solidity by using its balance data. Though less accurate than RiskCalc model in calculating rm default probability, it has the advantage of being available for all the years covered by the surveys. In this way, apart from testing the robustness of the results when the variable used as the index of risk was changed, we were able to verify whether our results depended on the Survey employed.
This check was carried out in two phases. In the rst phase we examined all the rms by a pooled estimate (with specic temporal variables of the surveys); then, we employed a panel estimate in order to verify the variability among rms. We will present instrumented estimates directly, since the problem of endogeneity is particularly dicult in this model specication. Table 11 presents the estimate which takes into account the time eects.
The main result was conrmed by this check. A company's Z-score is signicant for explaining innovation. There is a positive correlation, since this variable measures a rm's nancial solidity, so that a higher Z-score implies a lower rm risk.
With regards to other innovation determinants, almost all the variables which proved signicant in the basic model were signicant in this specication, the exceptions being the variables pointing to rm diversication, sector variables, the level of the concentration of the banking sector and the level of nancial development of the region where the rm had its headquarters.
Finally, some variables which were not signicant in the basic estimate were signicant in this one. Specically, the ISO9000 certicate were shown to increase the innovation probability of a rm. The geographic location of a rm deserves a special mention. If a rm was located in the South, it was more likely to innovate. This result contradicts the theoretical predictions. Table 12 shows the results of the panel estimate. In running this test we considered only the 644 businesses present in all the surveys. As regards the other variables, almost none of them was signicant, except for rm size, the inclusion in a consortium, the percentage of the employees holding a university degree and the inclusion in a specialized sector. All these variables had the same sign as the basic model.
Conclusions
Because of its importance in understanding and explaining growth, the topic of innovation has received a huge attention in the economic literature. Employing a rich sample of Italian manufacturing rms, we tested for the impact on innovation of the riskiness of the rm, as proxied by the one-year probability of default. We found that riskiness of enterprise reduces the tendency to innovate for the rms.
The main channel through which rm risk aects innovation capability appears to be that of innovation nancing. When rms are unable to nance autonomously their innovation projects, they are forced to apply for external funding. However, due to asymmetric information problems, even more evident in the case of innovative companies, banks can evaluate neither the quality of the project nor the possibility of opportunistic behavior by counterparties. In a similar context, the rms with higher default probability will hardly be able to nance their innovation. Our evidence might warrant some policy considerations. The link between rm risk and innovation may reduce the capability for economic system to emerge from crisis periods. Indeed, if innovation is one of the solutions to the diculties for enterprises, the negative eect of risk on innovation is like to reduce possibility of recovery. A more accurate study of the channel trough which rm risk aects innovation capability seems necessary. As to future research, our paper suggests developing a theoretical model featuring the transmission mechanism between risk and innovation. The table reports summary statistics (for each survey) for the variables included in the regression analysis. The table reports the number of observations by industry and the percentage of rms that realized innovations by industry. Product innovation refers to rms that introduced product or product-related organizational innovations. Process innovation refers to rms that introduced process or process-related organizational innovations. The table reports regression coecients and associated standard errors (between parentheses). The dependent variable is RISK, the rm's one-year probability of default. The regression is estimated by OLS. * * * , * * , * indicate statistically signicant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The table reports, as goodness-of-t tests, the R 2 and the Fstatistic. The table also reports the Durbin score (and its p-value) as a test of exogeneity of RISK (in the 2SLS model). The The table reports regression coecients, marginal eects and associated standard errors (between parentheses). The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value one if the rm introduced innovations, and zero otherwise. To control for endogeneity of Zscore, regressions are also estimated by two-stage least squares (2SLS) and by two-stage conditional maximum likelihood (2SCML). * * * , * * , * indicate statistically signicant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The 
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